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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Protections against compulsory self-incrimination are prevalent in Western in-
ternational and domestic law and norms.1 Military servicemembers, like private 
citizens, are subject to those standards and protections that international and do-
mestic law afford.2 However, unlike in the case of private citizens, the United 
States government has administrative interests in knowing whether its service-
members have been arrested or charged with a crime, including matters relating 
to personnel management and planning.3 This governmental interest is the prin-
cipal justification for promulgating regulations that compel servicemembers to 
report their own arrests and criminal charges.4 
Due to the nature of the information that the government seeks, information 
that could also serve as evidence in a criminal investigation, the government’s 
interest is inherently at odds with protections against self-incrimination.5 Courts 
have recognized this tension and accounted for it by permitting self-reporting 
regulations on a limited basis.6 However, United States military courts have held 
that for self-reporting regulations to survive scrutiny under self-incrimination 
protections, the regulations must be purely regulatory in nature, not punitive.7   
This Note attempts to show that due to the challenges of properly applying 
military self-reporting regulations as they currently stand and the ambiguities 
within self-incrimination protections, these self-reporting regulations are ulti-
mately used for punitive purposes and thus may run afoul of international and 
domestic self-incrimination standards. 
 
 1 E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Part III, art. 14, ¶ 3, Dec. 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]; Murray v. United Kingdom, 2007-V Eur. Ct. 
H.R. (1996), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-57980 (recognizing the privilege against 
self-incrimination under art. 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights) [hereinafter 
ECHR]; U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 2 See United States v. Serianne, 69 M.J. 8, 9 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (inferring that the self-
incrimination rights under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution apply to military 
members). 
 3 United States v. Castillo, 74. M.J. 160, 168 (C.A.A.F. 2015) (“[T]he Navy has a legiti-
mate administrative or regulatory interest in knowing whether sailors have been arrested by 
civilian authorities.”). 
 4 Serianne, 69 M.J. 8 at 9 (the regulatory exception applies “when the constitutional in-
terests of the individual must be balanced with the public need and instructs that ‘[t]he Fifth 
Amendment is not violated when the Government is allowed “to gain access to items or infor-
mation vested with . . . [a] public character.’”“) 
 5 See, e.g., id. 
 6 Id. 
 7 Id. (“The court concluded that the [regulation] was punitive rather than regulatory in 
nature, compelling an incriminatory testimonial communication . . . the court concluded that 
the Instruction could not be sustained as a regulatory exception.”) 
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Before attending law school and writing this note, I served as an active duty 
officer in the United States Marine Corps for just over ten years. During my ca-
reer in the Marines, I served as a pilot and legal officer, among other duties. 
While the hypothetical situation in this Note reflects my own military experience, 
the events in the hypothetical are fictitious. The opinions and conclusions I ad-
vance in this note are solely my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the 
Marine Corps or Navy. 
A. The Hypothetical 
It is 0715—7:15 AM in common parlance—on a Monday morning following 
a long holiday weekend. Lance Corporal Jones (Jones) waits outside the Sergeant 
Major’s8 office, visibly nervous. As I approach, he greets me with a sterile, 
“Good Morning, Sir,” and continues to stare straight ahead.9 I think nothing of it 
and proceed to my office, where I, a new pilot and junior officer, perform my 
non-flying duties as squadron legal officer. 10 The Sergeant Major arrives and 
beckons Jones into his office. The door shuts, and the Sergeant Major’s noticea-
bly angry voice can be heard through the walls. The door opens, Jones walks out, 
and the Sergeant Major informs me, as the legal officer, that Jones was arrested 
for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI) while vacationing in another 
state.11 Jones reported his DUI arrest to the Sergeant Major as required by appli-
cable Navy regulations, primarily Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 
 
 8 A Sergeant Major is the most senior enlisted Marine in an organizational unit. MOS 
8999 Sergeant Major-First Sergeant, MARINE CORPS COOL (last updated July 31, 2020), 
https://www.cool.navy.mil/usmc/enlisted/8999.htm. Generally, sergeants-major assist unit 
commanders in conducting disciplinary proceedings and investigations. Id. 
 9 Military “customs and courtesies” require junior members to render “greetings of the 
day,” among other things, when encountering members who are senior to them. See generally 
Marine Corps Order 5060.20, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS (May 15, 2019), 
https://www.marines.mil/portals/1/Publica-
tions/MCO%205060.20_signed_EDD.pdf?ver=2019-06-05-103257-473 (providing a de-
tailed description of standard Marine Corps customs, courtesies, ceremonies, and traditions). 
Failure to render appropriate customs and courtesies may result in prosecution under Article 
92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). 10 U.S.C. § 892 (1956). 
 10 A legal officer is a non-lawyer military officer who advises military commanders about 
legal considerations of military disciplinary proceedings and courts-martial under the UCMJ, 
among other things. Naval Justice School Annual Course Catalog Fiscal Year 2020, U.S. 
NAVY 32, https://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/Navy%202020%20Course%20Catalog.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 5, 2019). Legal officers in the Navy and Marine Corps receive approximately 
two weeks of formal military education and may perform their duties as a legal officer con-
currently with their more traditional military duties, like being a pilot or logistician. See id. 
(inferring that legal officer training is available for military officers who have considerable 
experience in non-legal specialties and responsibilities that extend beyond legal affairs). 
 11 DUI is punishable under Article 113, UCMJ.  10 U.S.C.A. § 913 (West 2019). 
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(OPNAVINST) 3120.32D.12 The Sergeant Major assures me that after Jones 
made his initial statement, but before Jones told the Sergeant Major the details 
of his arrest, he read Jones his Article 31(b) rights.13 
After hearing the news of Jones’s DUI, the Commanding Officer—the squad-
ron’s highest-ranking officer and my boss—instructs me to draft charges against 
Jones for violating Article 113 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), 
relying solely upon Jones’s conversation with the Sergeant Major as evidence. 
Shortly after, Jones appears in a non-judicial punishment proceeding, where he 
is found guilty.14 As punishment, the Commanding Officer reduces Jones’s rank, 
deprives him of one-half his monthly salary for two months, and physically re-
stricts Jones for thirty days.15 Several pertinent questions present themselves: But 
for Jones reporting his DUI charge, would he have been punished under Article 
113? Further, would Jones have been punished at all but for OPNAVINST 
3120.32D, which required Jones to report his DUI arrest? What about Jones’s 
right against self-incrimination? 
B. Outline of Argument 
By compelling servicemembers to self-report their civilian arrests and crimi-
nal charges, the United States military violates international law and norms that 
protect against compulsory self-incrimination, including the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR), and the 
Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This Note will first discuss why the 
United States may be violating international standards regarding compulsory 
 
 12 See DEP’T OF THE NAVY, OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, OPNAVINST 
3120.32D ¶ 5.1.6 (July 16, 2012), https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/Directives/03000%20 
Naval%20Operations%20and%20Readiness/03-100%20Naval%20Operations%20Support/3 
120.32D%20W%20CH-1.pdf, as amended by NAVADMIN 373/11 (8 Dec. 2011) [hereinafter 
OPNAVINST 3120.32D] (“Any person arrested or criminally charged by civil authorities will 
immediately advise their immediate commander of the fact that they were arrested or 
charged.”). 
 13 10 U.S.C. § 831(b) (2018) (“No person subject to this chapter may interrogate, or re-
quest any statement from, an accused or a person suspected of an offense without first inform-
ing him of the nature of the accusation and advising him that he does not have to make any 
statement regarding the offense of which he is accused or suspected and that any statement 
made by him may be used as evidence against him in a trial by court-martial.”). 
 14 See id. § 815 (authorizing military commanders to impose administrative punishment 
for minor offenses in lieu of trial by court-martial). 
 15 See id. § 815(b)(2)(H) (defining sentencing limitations of non-judicial punishment). 
Restriction is a common punishment that is highly tailorable by a servicemember’s com-
mander and takes the form of an order from the commander to the servicemember. See id. § 
815(b)(2)(H)(vi) (inferring that commanders may specify the limits and terms of restriction). 
For example, a restricted servicemember could be ordered to remain in uniform and on base 
at all times throughout the restriction period. 
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self-incrimination, including its own constitutional protections. Part II will dis-
cuss the origin of the self-reporting regulation, its evolution in response to 
caselaw, and its present state. Part III will then introduce applicable international 
law and standards and explain why domestic military law is applied to United 
States servicemembers in foreign states. Subsequently, Part IV will analyze the 
current state of the self-reporting regulation and whether or not it abides by in-
ternational standards relating to compulsory self-incrimination. Part IV will also 
examine whether violations of international standards have any meaningful im-
pact upon the United States military’s commitment to the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) and other international organizations. Finally, Part V will 
conclude that self-reporting regulations, as they presently stand, threaten service-
members’ right against self-incrimination under domestic and international law, 
and such violations may obliquely conflict with the status of forces agreement 
between the United States and NATO. 
II. BACKGROUND 
The current form of the substantive law that creates and defines servicemem-
bers’ duty to self-report follows from (1) the promulgation of Navy regulations, 
(2) judicial response to those regulations, and (3) subsequent amendments of in-
itial regulations in response to court rulings.16 As this area of the law has evolved, 
servicemember self-incrimination protections embedded within the law have be-
come considerably more robust, yet they do not afford servicemembers absolute 
immunity from prosecution.17   
A. OPNAVINST 3120.32D 
OPNAVINST 3120.32D is a comprehensive military order, promulgated by 
the Chief of Naval Operations, and internally titled “Standard Organization and 
Regulations of the U.S. Navy.”18 In a single paragraph, this order prescribes ser-
vicemembers’ duty to self-report and self-incrimination protections surrounding 
that duty, consolidating nearly a decade of substantive law surrounding compul-
sory self-reporting.19 
 
 16 See discussion infra Section II.B. (describing the evolution of the substantive law sur-
rounding the self-reporting requirement). 
 17 Id. (citing in support the case of United States v. Castillo, 74 M.J. 160, 162 (C.A.A.F. 
2015)). 
 18 See generally OPNAVINST 3120.32D supra note 12 (illustrating the diverse topics 
covered by this regulation, ranging from sentry duty to sleeping arrangements, among other 
things). 
 19 See Castillo, 74 M.J. at 162; see also discussion infra Section II.B. (describing the evo-
lution of the substantive law surrounding the self-reporting requirement). 
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i. Duties and Justification 
Paragraph 5.1.6 of the OPNAVINST 3120.32D, among other things, requires 
“[a]ny person arrested or criminally charged by civil authorities shall immedi-
ately advise their immediate commander of the fact that they were arrested or 
charged. The term arrest includes an arrest or detention, and the term charged 
includes the filing of criminal charges.”20 In the military, failure to follow a law-
ful order or regulation, including OPNAVINST 3120.32D, is punishable by law 
under Article 92, UCMJ.21 Returning to our hypothetical, had Jones failed to 
report his DUI arrest, he could be tried at a court-martial for violating Article 92, 
UCMJ for failing to comply with OPNAVINST 3120.32D, a presumably lawful 
regulation.22 
ii. Protections and Limitations 
OPNAVINST 3120.32D does, however, provide some protections in that it 
limits the information self-reporting servicemembers are required to disclose to 
include only “the date of arrest or criminal charges, the arresting or charging 
authority, and the offense for which [the servicemember was] arrested or 
charged.”23 Additionally, OPNAVINST 3120.32D states: 
[n]o person is under a duty to disclose any of the underlying facts 
concerning the basis for their arrest or criminal charges . . . . Dis-
closure of arrest or criminal charges is not an admission of guilt 
and may not be used as such, nor is it intended to elicit an admis-
sion from the person self-reporting. No person subject to the 
UCMJ may question a person self-reporting an arrest or criminal 
charges regarding any aspect of the self-report, unless they first 
advise the person of their rights under UCMJ Article 31(b).24 
On its face, OPNAVINST 3120.32D appears to protect servicemembers from 
self-incrimination by characterizing disclosure of arrest or criminal charges as 
“not an admission of guilt” that is not “intended to elicit an admission.”25 More-
over, the regulation appears to limit the substantive information obtained by 
commanders during a self-report, in turn, limiting the evidentiary value of the 
 
 20 OPNAVINST 3120.32D supra note 12, at ¶ 5.16. 
 21 10 U.S.C. § 892(1) (2018). 
 22 Id. 
 23 OPNAVINST 3120.32D supra note 12. 
 24 Id. 
 25 Id. 
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content of a self-report if it were permissible to use for punitive purposes.26 
Lastly, as a general limitation and possible implicit justification for flirting with 
compulsory self-incrimination, OPNAVINST 3120.32D’s stated purpose is “to 
monitor and maintain the personnel readiness, welfare, safety, and deployability 
of the force.”27 
B. Evolution of the Law Regarding Self-Report Regulations 
The constitutionality of the self-reporting regulations at issue in this note were 
first addressed by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.) in 
United States v. Serianne, 69 M.J. 8 (C.A.A.F. 2010).28 Though the Navy modi-
fied its self-reporting regulation in response to Serianne, the regulation was again 
challenged in Castillo.29 
i. United States v. Serianne, 69 M.J. 8 (C.A.A.F. 2010) 
In Serianne, C.A.A.F.30 addressed whether the appellee, a sailor who failed to 
report an arrest for driving under the influence of alcohol as required by a pre-
cursor of OPNAVINST 3120.32D, OPNAVINST 5350.4C, could be punished 
under Article 92, UCMJ for failure to self-report.31 At the time of appellee’s 
charged DUI offense, paragraph 8.n. of OPNAVINST 5350.4C stated: 
[m]embers arrested for an alcohol-related offense under civil au-
thority, which if punished under the UCMJ would result in a pun-
ishment of confinement for 1 year or more, or a punitive dis-
charge or dismissal from the Service (e.g., DUI/DWI), shall 
promptly notify their [Commanding Officer]. Failure to do so 
may constitute an offense punishable under Article 92, UCMJ.32 
While the court did not address the constitutionality of OPNAVINST 
5350.4C, the court did address what it ultimately determined to be a conflict 
 
 26 See id. (limiting the substantive content required to be disclosed in self-reports to “the 
date of arrest or criminal charges, the arresting or charging authority, and the offense for which 
[the servicemember was] arrested/charged”). 
 27 Id. 
 28 United States v. Serianne, 69 M.J. 8 (C.A.A.F. 2010). 
 29 See discussion infra Sections II.B.2–3. 
 30 The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces (C.A.A.F.) “is the military’s highest judi-
cial authority before the Supreme Court.” Randall Leonard & Joseph Toth, Failure to Report: 
The Right Against Self-Incrimination and the Navy’s Treatment of Civilian Arrests After 
United States v. Serianne, 213 MIL. L. REV. 1, 17 (2012). 
 31 Serianne, 69 M.J. at 10.  In Serianne, “OPNAVINST 5350.4C, Drug and Alcohol 
Abuse Prevention and Control (Dec. 8, 2005), [w]as the source of the self-reporting duty at 
issue.” Id. at 8. 
 32 Id. at 8–9. 
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between OPNAVINST 5350.4C and Navy regulations of superior regulatory au-
thority which provided protections against self-incrimination.33 However, the 
C.A.A.F. did not vacate or reverse the Navy-Marine Court of Criminal Appeals 
(NMCCA)34 decision; rather, it chose to avoid addressing the constitutionality of 
OPNAVINST 5350.4C altogether.35 
ii. Amended Self-Report Regulations 
In response to Serianne, the Navy amended its regulations.36 In July 2010, the 
Secretary of the Navy released an All Navy (ALNAV) administrative message 
(ALNAV 049/10) “disseminated throughout the Navy with the subject line 
‘Change to U.S. Navy Regulations in light of [United States. v. Serianne].’”37 
ALNAV 049/10 added new language to the Navy regulations to resolve conflict 
addressed by C.A.A.F. in Serianne: the “Secretary of the Navy, Chief of Naval 
Operations, and Commandant of the Marine Corps may promulgate regulations 
or instructions that require servicemembers to report civilian arrests or filing of 
criminal charges if those regulations or instructions serve a regulatory or admin-
istrative purpose.”38   
In December 2011, the Chief of Naval Operations released an additional ad-
ministrative message (NAVADMIN 373/11), amending OPNAVINST 
3120.32C to include the following: 
Any person arrested or criminally charged by civil authorities 
shall immediately advise their immediate commander of the fact 
that they were arrested or charged. The term arrest includes an 
arrest or detention, and the term charged includes the filing of 
criminal charges. Persons are only required to disclose the date 
of arrest/criminal charges, the arresting/charging authority, and 
the offense for which they were arrested/charged. No person is 
under a duty to disclose any of the underlying facts concerning 
the basis for their arrest or criminal charges. Disclosure is 
 
 33 Id. at 10 (“In determining whether to decide the present case on constitutional or non-
constitutional grounds, we may take into account the nonconstitutional regulatory matter dis-
cussed by the court below—the relationship between the self-reporting requirement in 
[OPNAVINST 5350.4C] and the exclusion from self-reporting provided in Article 1137 of the 
United States Navy Regulations.”). 
 34 NMCCA is the military appellate court immediately inferior to C.A.A.F. in authority.  
In Serianne, C.A.A.F. is reviewing NMCCA’s decision. Id. 
 35 Id.; Leonard & Toth, supra note 30, at 19 (“The CAAF did not address the NMCCA’s 
constitutional holding. Instead, it chose to avoid the constitutional question, citing the 
longstanding Avoidance Doctrine . . . .”). 
 36 United States v. Castillo, 74 M.J. 160, 162 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 
 37 Id. 
 38 Id. 
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required to monitor and maintain the personnel readiness, wel-
fare, safety, and deployability of the force. Disclosure of ar-
rest/criminal charges is not an admission of guilt and may not be 
used as such, nor is it intended to elicit an admission from the 
person self-reporting. No person subject to the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ) may question a person self-reporting an 
arrest/criminal charges regarding any aspect of the self-report, 
unless they first advise the person of their rights under UCMJ Ar-
ticle 31(b).39 
In addition to amending OPNAVINST 3120.32C, NAVADMIN 373/11 pro-
vided substantive and procedural guidance to military commanders relating to 
self-reports and disciplinary action.40 This guidance addressed two categories of 
disciplinary action: (1) disciplinary action for failure to self-report an arrest or 
criminal charge and (2) disciplinary action for offenses underlying the self-re-
port.41 Of particular note, NAVADMIN 373/11 imposed additional protections 
for self-reporting servicemembers, directing the following: 
Commanders may impose disciplinary action for failure to self-
report an arrest or criminal charges. However, when a service 
member does self-report pursuant to a valid self-reporting re-
quirement, commanders will not impose disciplinary action for 
the underlying offense unless such disciplinary action is based 
solely on evidence derived independently of the self-report. Com-
manders should consult a judge advocate prior to imposing disci-
plinary action.42 
 
 39 U.S. NAVY, NAVADMIN 373/11, CHANGE TO U.S. NAVY REGULATIONS IN LIGHT OF 
U.S. V. SERIANNE ¶ 4(C) (2011), https://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/reference/messages/ 
Documents2/NAV2011/NAV11373.txt. 
 40 Id. ¶ 6. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. ¶ 6(B) (emphasis added).  NAVADMIN 373/11’s recommendation that command-
ers consult a judge advocate, a military lawyer, is noteworthy in that it highlights the elevated 
complexity of imposing disciplinary action upon self-reporting servicemembers. Cf. 10 U.S.C. 
§ 815 (2019) (empowering military commanders to impose nonjudicial punishment without 
convening a court-martial or consulting a judge advocate); DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, 
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL pt. 5, ¶ 2 (2019) (stating no express requirement that a com-
mander consult a judge advocate prior to initiating nonjudicial punishment proceedings); 
USN/USMC Commander’s Quick Reference Legal Handbook 1, 37 (June 2020),  
https://www.jag.navy.mil/documents/NJS/Quickman.pdf (inferring that absent a regulation 
like NAVADMIN 373/11, a commander has no default requirement to consult a judge advo-
cate prior to imposing nonjudicial punishment) (“A [commander] has broad discretion over 
which offenses should be handled under the provisions of [10 U.S.C. § 815] . . . . A unit’s 
Staff Judge Advocate can assist in this determination.”). 
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These additional self-report protections were not incorporated with the other 
amendments to OPNAVINST 3120.32C.43 
iii. United States v. Castillo, 74 M.J. 160 (C.A.A.F. 2015) 
In United States v. Castillo, 74 M.J. 160 (C.A.A.F. 2015), the court was again 
faced with a case involving a sailor who failed to report her arrest for drunk driv-
ing and was therefore accused of violating Article 92 of the UCMJ.44 In Castillo, 
unlike Serianne, the post-Serianne amendments to Navy regulations and admin-
istrative guidance were in effect.45 In that case, the court addressed “[w]hether 
the lower court improperly determined that [the] duty to self-report one’s own 
criminal arrests found in office of the Chief of Naval Operations Instruction 
3120.32C was valid despite the instruction’s obvious conflict with superior au-
thority and the Fifth Amendment.”46 After determining that the self-report regu-
lation did not conflict with superior regulatory authority, the court turned to the 
question involving the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.47 
The court asked two questions: (1) “whether the self-reporting regulation can be 
applied in a manner that upholds the Constitution,” and (2) “whether it was so 
applied to Appellant.”48 The court declined to resolve “hypothetical situations 
designed to test the limits” of the regulation, limiting its inquiry to the application 
of OPNAVINST 3120.32C to the appellant.49 After considering the regulation’s 
safeguards against further questioning or prosecution, the court determined that 
the regulation did not “present[] a ‘real and appreciable’ hazard of self-incrimi-
nation, where the regulation is in fact followed as drafted.”50 Ultimately, the 
court held that OPNAVINST 3120.32C was “facially constitutional and author-
ized by U.S. Naval Regs., Article 1137.”51 In short, the court certified that the 
amendments to the regulation, resulting from Serianne, effectively cured the reg-
ulation’s deficiencies. 
 
 43 U.S. NAVY, supra note 39 ¶ 1. 
 44 United States v. Castillo, 74 M.J. 160, 161 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 
 45 Id. at 162–63. 
 46 Id. at 161. 
 47 Id. at 165. 
 48 Id. at 165–66. 
 49 Id. at 166. (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 22 (2010)). 
 50 Castillo, 74 M.J. at 166 (emphasis added) (“[A]lthough a reasonable argument exists 
that the compelled disclosure of an arrest by civilian authorities is testimonial and incriminat-
ing, the reporting requirement prohibits commanders from imposing disciplinary action on the 
basis of the underlying arrested offense, ‘unless such disciplinary action is based solely on 
evidence derived independently of the self-report.’”). 
 51 Id. at 168. 
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C. Amplifying Regulations and Administrative Guidance 
In addition to their initial issuance in NAVADMIN 373/11, the self-reporting 
protections to which the Castillo court referred were codified in the Navy’s Judge 
Advocate General Instruction 5800.7F CH-2: Manual of the Judge Advocate 
General (JAGMAN).52 Elaborating upon the substantive protections included in 
NAVADMIN 373/11, § 0108(c) of the JAGMAN further defines, among other 
things, what constitutes “evidence derived independently of the required self-
report.”53 JAGMAN § 0108(c)(3) states: 
[i]ndependent evidence may not be derived from information re-
ceived from the Service member through a required self-report. 
If the only reason the command knows about the arrest, charging, 
or conviction is the self-report, then the command does not have 
independent evidence unless the [s]ervice member makes an in-
criminating statement after receiving notification of and waiving 
his or her Article 31 rights.54 
Section 0108 goes on to provide examples of independent evidence, but makes 
no further mention of incriminating statements made after Article 31 rights noti-
fication as independent evidence.55 The italicized portion of JAGMAN § 
0108(c)(3) above poses a critical question: if a servicemember is only being 
questioned as the result of her self-report, even if the servicemember waives her 
Article 31 rights and makes incriminating statements, would those statements 
constitute independent evidence? Though the JAGMAN is an inferior regulatory 
authority in comparison to OPNAVINST 3120.32D,56 its relatively detailed ex-
planations and concrete examples of the self-report process render it a valuable 
tool for military commanders and their legal teams in light of OPNAVINST 
3120.32D ¶ 5.1.6’s broad language. 
 
 52 U.S. NAVY, JAGINST 5800.7F CH-3, MANUAL OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE GENERAL, 
§ 0108(C) (2020), https://www.secnav.navy.mil/doni/SECNAV%20Manuals1/5800.7F%20C 
H-3.pdf [hereinafter JAGMAN].  The purpose of the JAGMAN is to “prescribe regulations 
implementing or supplementing certain provisions of the UCMJ or the [Manual for Courts-
Martial].”  Id. § 0101(a). 
 53 Id. § 0108(c)(2). 
 54 Id. § 0108(c)(3) (emphasis added). 
 55 Id. (“Examples of independent evidence include: (a) News reports or social media; (b) 
Third-party reporting; (c) Unsolicited information conveyed by the arresting or charging au-
thority; or (d) Bona fide command programs to screen for criminal information involving Ser-
vice members (e.g., weekly screen of arrest records for names of command members).”). 
 56 The JAGMAN is promulgated by the Judge Advocate General of the Navy who is sub-
ordinate to the Chief of Naval Operations, the promulgator of OPNAVINST 3120.32D. 
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D. Applying the Self-Report Regulation: Decisions for Commanders and 
Service Members 
In handling self-reports, military commanders and their legal teams57 must 
consider the amalgam of legal authority58 that has evolved since Serianne. 
Though OPNAVINST 3120.32D and the JAGMAN are intended to provide 
commanders with sufficient guidance for processing self-reports, it seems diffi-
cult to capture the nuanced judicial opinions within relatively short regulations. 
Though it may seem readily obvious that a commander should consult a judge 
advocate when facing complex legal issues, neither the text of OPNAVINST 
3120.32D nor the JAGMAN requires commanders to consult a judge advocate 
when handling self-reporting cases.59 Of the three authoritative documents in this 
paragraph, only NAVADMIN 373/11, a message nearly a decade old, requires 
commanders to consult a judge advocate prior to imposing disciplinary action in 
self-reporting cases.60 Thus, it seems unlikely that a commander who is contem-
plating disciplinary proceedings in a self-reporting case will know she is required 
to consult with a judge advocate unless she or her staff is aware of NAVADMIN 
373/11. 
III. LAW 
Unlike much of U.S. domestic law, domestic military law remains applicable 
in foreign states where the United States has a military presence,61 often through 
a status of forces agreement (SOFA).62 For instance, U.S. servicemembers 
 
 57 The sophistication of a commander’s legal team varies based upon the commander’s 
military rank and station. Practically speaking, this means that commanders, who are generally 
not judge advocates, may not have constant or immediate access to a military lawyer. See 
generally U.S. MARINE CORPS, MCRP 5-12D: ORGANIZATION OF MARINE CORPS FORCES 6-2 
(1998), https://www.marines.mil/Portals/1/Publications/MCRP%205-12D%20Organization 
%20of%20Marine%20Corps%20Forces.pdf (highlighting the relative scarcity of military at-
torneys, known as “judge advocates,” within the organizational structure of the Marine Corps). 
 58 This amalgam consists of OPNAVINST3120.32D, its modifying administrative mes-
sages like ALNAV 049/10 and NAVADMIN 373/11, supplemental regulations like the 
JAGMAN, and caselaw. 
 59 OPNAVINST 3120.32D, supra note 12; JAGMAN, supra note 52. 
 60 NAVADMIN 373/11, supra note 39. 
 61 E.g., North Atlantic Treaty Organization Agreement between the Parties to the North 
Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces, art. 7, Jun. 19, 1951, 4 U.S.T. 1792, 199 
U.N.T.S 67 (“The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise 
exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with respect to 
offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending State, 
but not by the law of the receiving State.”) [hereinafter NATO SOFA]. 
 62 R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL7-5700, STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT 
(SOFA): WHAT IS IT, AND HOW HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? 1 (2012) (“SOFAs provide for rights 
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serving in NATO countries may exclusively be under the jurisdiction of U.S. 
military law.63 Further, in some cases where the host country and the United 
States exercise concurrent jurisdiction over an offense, the “military authorities 
of the [United States] shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a 
member of a force . . . .”64 Therefore, in situations where a foreign country’s laws 
would normally apply to civilian U.S. nationals, in the case of U.S. servicemem-
bers, U.S. military law still applies—often exclusively. Section A will discuss 
two international agreements that bar compulsory self-incrimination to illustrate 
how OPNAVINST 3120.32D is problematic—beyond the applicability of U.S. 
law on foreign soil. 
A. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
On December 19, 1966, the United Nations General Assembly opened the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) for signature.65 The 
United States signed the ICCPR on October 5, 1977 and ratified it on June 8, 
1992.66 Article 14 of the ICCPR is primarily concerned with rights and protec-
tions for persons accused of crimes and provides protections for the accused in a 
similar fashion to the Bill of Rights contained within the U.S. Constitution.67 
Article 14, paragraph 3(g) of the ICCPR guarantees that a person accused of a 
crime shall “[n]ot . . . be compelled to testify against himself or to confess 
guilt.”68 Thus, given the similarities in the text and structure of the ICCPR and 
U.S. Constitution, a violation of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution 
would likely constitute a violation of Article 14 of the ICCPR, provided that the 
purported violator has ratified the treaty. 
B. The American Convention on Human Rights 
On November 22, 1969, the ACHR was adopted at the Inter-American Spe-
cialized Conference on Human Rights in San José, Costa Rica.69 The United 
 
and privileges of covered individuals while in a foreign jurisdiction and address how the do-
mestic laws of the foreign jurisdiction apply to U.S. personnel.”). 
 63 Id. 
 64 NATO SOFA supra note 61, at art. 7. 
 65 ICCPR, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
 66 Id. 
 67 ICCPR, supra note 1, at Part III, art. 14 (guaranteeing that defendants are entitled to 
“communicate with counsel of his own choosing,” to “be tried without undue delay,” and to 
“examine, or have examined, the witnesses against him,” among other guarantees); cf. U.S. 
CONST. amend. VI. (guaranteeing that defendants “have the assistance of counsel,” “shall en-
joy the right to a speedy and public trial,” and “be confronted with the witnesses against him”). 
 68 ICCPR, supra note 1, at Part III, art. 14; cf. U.S. CONST. amend. V. (guaranteeing that 
no person “shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself”). 
 69 American Convention on Human Rights: “Pact of San José, Costa Rica,” Nov. 22, 1969, 
1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter AHCR]. 
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States signed, but did not ratify, the ACHR on June 1, 1977.70 Among other 
things, Article 8(2)(g) of the ACHR guarantees every person, “the right not to be 
compelled to be a witness against himself.”71 The ACHR, similar to the Fifth and 
Sixth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution, provides protections for those ac-
cused of a crime, including the right “to be assisted by legal counsel” and to 
“examine witnesses.”72 Given the textual and structural similarities, a violation 
of the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution would likely constitute a viola-
tion of Article 8(2)(g) of the ACHR. 
IV. APPLICATION 
By examining realistic hypothetical situations similar to the hypothetical pre-
sented in the Introduction, this analysis will determine whether the OPNAVINST 
3120.32D—in its current state—conflicts with the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution and thus conflicts with international self-incrimination standards. 
Specifically, this analysis will address two broad questions. First, this analysis 
will consider whether the current law is theoretically sound but sufficiently dif-
ficult to apply in practice, subjecting servicemembers who self-report—pursuant 
to the self-reporting regulation requirement—to an unacceptable risk of prosecu-
tion. Second, this analysis will assess whether the law in its current state, when 
applied correctly, creates unacceptable risk of prosecution to self-reporting ser-
vicemembers. 
A. Difficulties in Application of Self-Report Regulations 
While OPNAVINST 3120.32D’s protections may be sufficient “where the 
regulation is in fact followed as drafted,”73 whether the regulation is actually 
followed as written is a separate question.74 In the event that OPNAVINST 
3120.32D is incorrectly followed, exposing servicemembers to an unacceptable 
risk of self-incrimination, it is important to consider why it was followed incor-
rectly. If the regulation is followed incorrectly, out of bad faith or other reasons 
unrelated to the text of the regulation, then changes to the regulation would likely 
 
 70 United Nations Treaty Collection, https://treaties.un.org/Pages/showDetails.aspx?objid 
=08000002800f10e1&clang=_en (last visited Sept. 16, 2020); see also ECHR, supra note 1 
(recognizing a right not to incriminate oneself under the ECHR, another treaty that the United 
States has not ratified). 
 71 AHCR, supra note 69, art. 8(2)(g). 
 72 Id.; cf. U.S. CONST. amends. V–VI. (guaranteeing that defendants “shall [not] be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself,” “have the assistance of counsel,” 
“shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,” and “be confronted with the witnesses 
against him”). 
 73 United States v. Castillo, 74 M.J. 160, 166 (C.A.A.F. 2015). 
 74 See id. (inferring that misapplication of the regulation could present a “real and appre-
ciable” hazard of self-incrimination (quoting Marchetti v. U.S., 390 U.S. 39, 48 (1968))). 
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have little to no effect in remedying the misapplication. Alternatively, if a ser-
vicemember of average sophistication in a leadership position, such as the legal 
officer in the introductory hypothetical, cannot apply the regulation as written 
without subjecting the self-reporting servicemember to unacceptable risk of self-
incrimination, the regulation may be in conflict with self-incrimination standards 
similar to those adopted by the ICCPR, ECHR, and ACHR. 
i. Misapplication by Commanders 
Between the commander and servicemember, the commander is generally the 
more sophisticated of the two in terms of regulatory knowledge and access to 
military legal specialists.75 Assuming that judge advocates and legal officers are 
aware of OPNAVINST 3120.32D, a commander will likely take appropriate ac-
tion if he consults these advisors, given the advisors’ formal education in military 
law. This likelihood increases, a fortiori, if the legal advisors in question are 
actual attorneys. Conversely, where a commander is faced with a self-reporting 
case and has no access to a legal advisor, either due to scarcity or timing,76 the 
likelihood of such case being properly handled diminishes. Therefore, the pro-
priety of a commander’s handling of a self-reporting case relies largely upon the 
timing of the report and the commander’s access to legal advice. 
ii. Misapplication by the Self-Reporting Servicemember 
Like the commander, the greater the servicemember’s knowledge of the self-
reporting regulation and his rights under the UCMJ, the more likely his self-in-
crimination rights will remain intact. However, the self-reporting process under 
the regulation may be confusing for a layperson, and perhaps even an attorney 
may find it difficult to ascertain where the regulation’s self-incrimination protec-
tions begin and end. A layperson may not foresee that the initial, mandatory self-
report is protected under the regulation, but that his immediate follow-up state-
ment after being read his Article 31(b) rights is not protected—or is it? If the 
JAGMAN requires that the evidence used for disciplinary action be independ-
ent,77 and that evidence is a voluntary statement that would not have occurred 
but for the self-report, does that constitute independent evidence regardless of 
the Article 31(b) warning? The answer to this question does not expressly appear 
in the JAGMAN nor in OPNAVINST 3120.32D. Given the complexity of the 
 
 75 See U.S. MARINE CORPS, supra note 57 (inferring that between a commander and a non-
commander servicemember, a commander has more access to military legal experts). 
 76 For instance, if a servicemember self-reports to an immediate supervisor after hours, 
the commander may not have an opportunity to seek legal advice before that supervisor reads 
the servicemember his Article 31(b) rights and takes a voluntary and self-incriminating state-
ment. 
 77 JAGMAN, supra note 52. 
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procedures involved in a self-report, a servicemember could easily waive his 
right to remain silent inadvertently. It seems counterintuitive that a servicemem-
ber must self-report at the outset, but after the talismanic Article 31(b) warning 
is given, the servicemember must not self-report if she wants to preserve her self-
incrimination protections. Such procedures hardly guarantee any rights against 
self-incrimination. 
B. International Ramifications 
The international ramifications of OPNAVINST 3120.32D are unclear. On 
one hand, the NATO SOFA—the SOFA with the United States’ arguably most 
visible alliance—is noticeably silent about self-incrimination, despite enumerat-
ing other familiar-sounding rights of the accused.78 On the other hand, Germany, 
a NATO member, employs “procedures against self-incrimination [that] are 
equal to, or perhaps even stronger than, American standards.”79 
Moreover, all thirty NATO members80 have agreed to be bound by the ICCPR, 
which prohibits compulsory self-incrimination.81 Thus, if the NATO SOFA 
binds NATO members to either the member’s law or its NATO host-nation’s 
law, and all NATO members have agreed to be bound by the ICCPR, it follows 
that a violation of the ICCPR constitutes a violation of the NATO SOFA? The 
inference that a violation of a servicemember’s self-incrimination rights consti-
tutes a violation of the NATO SOFA may appear to be a stretch. However, the 
fact that each NATO member condemns compulsory self-incrimination via the 
ICCPR is in itself significant and may effectively negate the proposition that the 
NATO SOFA is silent about self-incrimination. Additionally, having ratified the 
ICCPR, the United States is bound by the ICCPR independent of any SOFA, 
including the NATO SOFA. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. military, in its promulgation of the U.S. Navy’s OPNAVINST 
3120.32D, risks conflict with international law and standards concerning 
 
 78 NATO SOFA, supra note 61 at § 9 (guaranteeing visiting servicemembers in a NATO 
member the right to “a prompt and speedy trial,” “to be confronted with the witnesses against 
him,” and “to have legal representation,” among other things, but omitting protections against 
compulsory self-incrimination). 
 79 OFFICE OF THE JUDGE ADVOCATE, HEADQUARTERS USAREUR AND 7TH ARMY, 
COUNTRY LAW STUDY: GERMANY 45 (2007), https://www.aepubs.eur.army.mil/Portals/18/ 
docs/CLS-Germany.pdf; see generally STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STOP] [CODE OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE], as amended by Article 3 of the Act of 23 April 2014, §§ 114–15, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html (Ger.). 
 80 NATO Member Countries, NATO, (May 31, 2020, 1:32 PM), https://www.nato.int/ 
cps/en/natohq/nato_countries.htm. 
 81 ICCPR, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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compulsory self-incrimination. As military self-reporting regulations have 
evolved in response to caselaw, later iterations of self-reporting regulations—
including OPNAVINST 3120.32D—have implemented protections that signifi-
cantly reduce or eliminate the risk of compulsory self-incrimination when fol-
lowed as drafted. The complexity of OPNAVINST 3120.32D, however, and the 
danger of its misapplication raise serious concerns about its compliance with do-
mestic and international law, including the Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Consti-
tution, the ICCPR, and the NATO SOFA. While the practical ramifications of 
OPNAVINST 3120.32D are impinging upon international law, including the 
NATO SOFA, they are unlikely to eclipse the importance of protecting service-
members’ Fifth Amendment rights. The near-universality of protections against 
self-incrimination underscore the importance of self-incrimination protections 
and urge further review of self-reporting regulations such as OPNAVINST 
3120.32D. 
 
